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This study investigates the effects of the corporatization process – i.e., the transformation of a municipal firm 
into a limited liability company – on the production costs of local public services whose ownership is 
maintained by the local government. Theoretical analysis predicts that, even without privatization, 
corporatization is a potentially effective way to improve efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Stiglitz, 2000). 
We explore this issue by using information on a typical local utility, such as the bus service provided by 
public transit systems in Italy, which experienced a reform of the governance towards the 
corporatization structure during the ’90s. The results on a sample of 33 local bus companies over the 
period 1993-2002 show that, even if public ownership persists, the transformation of a municipal 
enterprise into an autonomous company – corresponding to the first stage of the corporatization of local 
utilities in Italy – or into a limited liability company exerts a reducing impact on production costs.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Despite the huge wave of privatization started in the mid-‘80s around Europe, 
many public utilities, especially at the local level, are still under the control of 
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the State: at the end of 2000, through ownership or golden shares, central or 
local governments controlled more than 60% of privatized firms (Bortolotti and 
Faccio, 2009). Even in the case of publicly-provided services, a firm’s internal 
governance may change over time, following a process which has been labeled 
corporatization by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Corporatized companies represent a 
hybrid form between state-owned enterprises and private firms. In a 
corporatized firm, the transfer of control rights from politicians to managers 
occurs independently from pure privatization. Mainly, it implies a change in the 
ownership rights and the potential introduction of incentives to managers’ 
performance. Acting as residual claimants, managers are more keen to bear 
additional risk and to face increased responsibility. In this case, politicians 
continue to exercise their control rights over the firms through regulation, but 
no longer through the direct provision of public services. As pointed out by 
Stiglitz (2000:206): “Typically, before a government enterprise is privatized, it goes through 
the intermediate stage of corporatization. Most of the efficiency gains seem to occur in this 
stage, though there is controversy about why. Some argue that the freedom from government 
personnel, procurement, and budget restrictions is all that is required; under corporatization, 
effective incentive schemes can be put into place.” 
Theoretical predictions we can derive from existing literature show that, as long 
as a firm changes its ownership status, a better alignment of incentives between 
managers and shareholders pushes the former to increase cost-reducing efforts. 
We claim that this effect still holds even for a special kind of institutional change; 
i.e., the corporatization of a State-owned firm. When privatization is not possible 
or is opposed by politicians, corporatization, by structuring the internal 
governance system of State-owned firms to be similar to that of a modern 
corporation, may in fact improve the monitoring of managers and reduce 
governmental political intervention, as well as affect the incentives and objectives 
of managers (Aivazian et al., 2005). By reallocating control rights to managers, 
corporatization thus acts as a potentially effective instrument in providing 
incentives to improve performance and increase efficiency.  
The aim of the present study is to contribute to the literature on the 
performance of State-owned enterprises by empirically investigating the effects 
of institutional changes on the internal governance of local utilities which 
continue to be owned (fully or through a majority share) by the State (i.e., local 
governments). To that purpose, we exploit the information on cost structure 
and institutional organization available for a sample of 33 Italian local bus 
companies observed over the period 1993-2002. Throughout this time span, all 
firms remain owned by a local government, but some of them change their 
governance status from a fully public-owned company to a corporatized one. 
The Italian public transit system therefore represents an ideal natural 
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experiment to evaluate the effect of corporatization. Such an experiment allows 
us to address the question of whether a restructured governance system can 
positively influence the performance of these companies even if public 
ownership persists. To the best of our knowledge, our paper represents one of 
the few studies that quantify the impact of corporatization within State-owned 
firms or other governmental agencies, and the first one that analyzes its impact 
on the cost performance of local public utilities. 
This paper differs from previous studies aimed at evaluating the impact of 
market and regulatory reforms within the local public transport sector. The majority 
of these studies focus on the effect of competitive bidding on firms’ 
performance. For example, Hensher and Wallis (2005) show that over fifteen years 
competitive tendering and privatization brought about a 50-55% reduction in real 
unit costs in London, whilst in Scandinavia there were savings ranging from 5 to 
34%, with most in the range of 20-30%. However, this evidence is mixed. The 
appraisal of the French experience casts some doubts on the efficiency-
enhancing properties of competitive tendering. In fact, competition has not been 
fostered in France after the adoption of competitive bidding and the performance 
indicators of the market are still mediocre (Yvrande-Billon, 2006). These results have 
been confirmed in Amaral et al. (2009) and Yvrande-Billon (2009), showing that, 
notwithstanding the introduction of auction procedures, the two alternative 
models for organizing local public transportation in France and London lead to 
very different results: few competitors, collusion, and cost increases in the French 
model, compared with more transparency, competition, and better performance 
in London. Competitive bidding can be seen as a new contractual agreement 
between the firm and the local government for the provision of local public 
transport services. However, it differs from corporatization where ownership 
remains unchanged and it is specifically focused on the internal re-organization of 
the utility firm. None of the above-mentioned studies specifically addresses this 
issue and analyzes its impact on firm’s efficiency.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 surveys the relevant 
literature and provides a simple theoretical framework that illustrates the 
efficiency effect stemming from the introduction of corporatization. Section 3 
reviews the main institutional steps with which corporatization has been 
introduced in Italy within local public services. Section 4 presents the empirical 
analysis, including model specification, data, estimation strategy and results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
Corporatization and Firm Performance / 197
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1428
2. CORPORATIZATION OF PUBLICLY-OWNED 
FIRMS: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relationship between ownership issues and managerial performance and 
their impact on firm’s efficiency has received quite a considerable amount of 
attention in the economic debate, but much less so when specifically applied to 
local public utilities. The majority of studies focus mainly on the ownership 
effect, i.e., on the comparison of performance, efficiency and other economic 
parameters between private and State-owned enterprises.  
On the theoretical side, Laffont and Tirole (1991) show that State-owned firms 
find it difficult to monitor managers due both to a lack of incentives for the 
owner to monitor manager performance, and to the absence of informational 
signals from stock market participants about managers’ actions. Therefore, the 
lack of information reduces the managerial incentive to behave efficiently. In 
addition, State-owned enterprises are more likely to exhibit excessively high 
costs; since managers can obtain only a fraction of the benefits generated by 
cost-reducing efforts, they face less binding financial constraints and could be 
more influenced by political parties (Hart et al., 1997; Shleifer, 1998; Tirole, 2001). 
Martimort (2006) shows that contract incompleteness and, more specifically, the 
limits of regulatory commitment and State control, may affect the decision to 
privatize a utility, as well as its ex post performance. The promise not to 
intervene ex post is more credible under private production than under State 
ownership, and private firms are thus expected to invest more in cost-reducing 
activities that secure larger benefits and higher (implicit or explicit) rewards.  
In a similar vein, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that corporatization also exerts 
a positive impact on a firm’s relative efficiency. According to their model, 
when managers have additional control rights over the firm, they may (at least 
partially) restructure the latter and reduce excess employment. At the same 
time, they are still likely to obtain public transfers from the government, which 
means that budget constraints can remain soft under corporatization. 
More recently, Hoppe and Schmitz (2010) analyze a situation in which the 
responsibility for certain elements of the public operations is vested in 
separated (private as well as public) hands. The authors depart from the 
standard property rights approach à la Hart et al. (1997), assuming that 
investment tasks can be separated between private and public agents, and are 
“contractible control actions” in the terms of Aghion et al. (2004); that is, it is 
possible to contractually specify who is in charge of which tasks and who bears 
the investment costs. One of the main results of these authors relies on the 
private-public partnership case: whenever bargaining power is relatively 
balanced between the (local) government and the private sector, and they both 
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agree on a partnership (i.e., on a division of tasks), it is optimal to assign the 
cost investment to the (private) manager and the quality investment to the 
government. This study theoretically confirms how an optimal allocation of 
tasks matters in increasing firm efficiency, and also that a specific contractual 
arrangement such as corporatization – where the firm remains publicly-owned 
but is run as it would be in a private context – could indeed be an institutional 
mechanism to enhance firm efficiency. 
Some theoretical insights which are relevant for the topic of our paper also come 
from the literature on vertical integration and hierarchies (e.g., Williamson, 1985, and 
Riordan, 1990). For example, the selection intervention puzzle, according to which “asset 
mal-utilization” and “accounting contrivance” are two incentive distortions 
associated with vertical integration (in our case this can be seen as a State-owned 
enterprise that opts for the in-house provision of local public service), implies that 
managers will take value-reducing actions to protect their own returns and asset 
values (Williamson, 1984; Crémer, 2010). On the other hand, corporatization is a 
governance form that is less subject to bureaucratic distortions and allows 
higher-powered incentives than the “vertically integrated” structure. 
The bulk of studies that empirically analyze the impact of ownership changes 
show that privatization exerts positive effects on both firm profitability and 
efficiency (see the survey by Megginson and Netter (2001)). In particular, for the 
influence of ownership structure on managerial behavior, there is evidence that 
when firms are transformed into private companies, the new owners start to 
monitor managers’ behavior and begin to introduce effective incentive 
mechanisms (Cragg and Dyck, 1999). 
The relatively few studies that have analyzed the case of mixed ownership 
suggest a positive effect on performance (e.g., Boardman and Vining, 1989; and, for 
local public utilities, Roy and Yvrande-Billon, 2007),1 which is mainly due to a better 
alignment of incentives between managers and shareholders, even in the 
presence of not completely contestable firms (Gupta, 2005).  
Evidence on the effects of corporatization is even more scant. For example, 
both Aivazian et al. (2005) (who concentrate on manufacturing firms in China, 
where an important reform program introduced corporatization without 
privatization) and Bilodeau et al. (2007) (who deal with government agencies 
in Canada) found positive effects for such a form of internal governance 
                                                
1 It is worth remarking that the benefits from partial privatization are not always confirmed by 
the empirical evidence. For instance, Garrone et al. (2007) analyze the effects of privatization and 
management control on the cost efficiency of a sample of local Italian utilities active in gas, 
electricity and water distribution and waste management. They find no evidence of inefficiently 
high costs for utilities owned by the municipalities and conclude that the partial privatization 
process does not per se generate an increase in efficiency. 
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structure. Our paper contributes to this limited strand of literature by 
offering new evidence on the impact of corporatization on the provision of 
local public utilities services. 
2.1. A THEORETICAL BENCHMARK 
Before presenting the dataset and the empirical analysis, we sketch a stylized 
model inspired by Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Hart et al. (1997) and Hart (2003) 
that provides an intuitive explanation of the efficiency effect stemming from 
the introduction of corporatization within State-owned firms.  
Suppose that a government wants a certain service to be provided (i.e., local 
public transportation). One option is to provide it “in-house,” i.e., by hiring 
public employees who are then paid a fixed wage, P. Another possibility is to 
let the service be provided by a state-owned firm which is run independently 
by a public manager. The government is the owner of all assets and controls 
the residual rights over the service; however, in order to provide its manager 
with additional incentives, the government could agree to renegotiate ex post 
with the manager and give him part of its residual rights. 
Using the incomplete contract approach, let M be the manager providing the 
services and G be the government. The provision of the service yields some 
benefit for society, denoted by B, but also some cost to be produced, denoted 
by C. The manager can influence both B and C through effort choices. An 
increase in his effort reduces the production cost, but at the same time affects 
the service quality in the following way: 
)(0 ebBB −=          (1) 
)(ecFC −=   (2) 
where e denotes the observable but not verifiable effort devoted to cost 
reduction. 0(.) ≥c  and 0(.) ≥b  are the reduction in cost and in quality due to 
the effort, respectively. The following assumptions for convexity and 
monotonicity hold: 0(.) ≥′b , 0(.) ≥′′b ; c(0) = 0, ∞=′(.)c , 0(.) ≥′c , 0(.) <′′c , 
0)( =∞′c ; 0(.)(.) ≥′−′ bc , meaning that the quality reduction due to an increase 
in effort does not offset cost reduction. The total costs of M are: eecFC +−= )( . 
The time-line of the game is as follows: in stage 1, manager M and 
government G write a contract for service provision; in stage 2, M chooses a 
level of effort to maximize his own utility; in stage 3, renegotiation will occur 
over the net benefits generated by the manager’s performance.  
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To determine the benchmark case, assume that e is contractible and so 
verifiable. The first-best allocation derives from the maximization of the net 
surplus generated by the provision of the service, i.e. 
eecFebBMax
e
−+−− )()(0   (3) 
The first-best effort level, e*, is given by the following condition: 
1*)(*)( =′+′− eceb . The optimal solution is when the marginal social benefit of 
spending extra effort to reduce cost is equal to the marginal cost of that effort. 
Now, assume that the service is directly managed by the local government 
through a public employee running the firm. The benefits from the service are 
collected by the government, which also pays the operating costs for the 
service’s provision. This manager receives a fixed salary since he is a public 
employee and it is not possible for him to renegotiate the contract ex post. 
Therefore, the manager chooses the effort level ( DMe ) that maximizes his own 
utility, i.e. 
ePMax
e
−  (4) 
It is straightforward to see that the optimal effort level in this case is equal to 
zero, i.e. 0=DMe . The manager does not have any incentive to enhance his 
effort because he cannot benefit from his action. Therefore, in this case we 
expect the cost efficiency to be very small. 
Suppose now that a manager has more flexibility and responsibility in his 
activity; therefore, he is able to renegotiate ex post his salary according to the 
impact of his effort on the firm’s performance. Since the firm is still owned by 
the State, the manager is able to renegotiate only over a share α  of the net 
benefit derived from the effort choice. The parameter α  represents the degree 
of incentive power that the government can use in its contract with the 
manager. High values of α imply strong incentives for managers and a high 
level of firm efficiency. The parameter α  can be interpreted as the different 
degree of responsibility of a manager: his responsibility for firm performance is 
null (α  = 0) in a directly-managed firm, since he is only an employee of the 
government; on the contrary, the manager may have a larger responsibility, as 
in a limited liability company still owned by the local municipality, but to run 
the firm he requires a (monetary or non-monetary) incentive to reward the 
additional risk to be faced ( 0>α ). 
We can alternatively interpret the parameter α as an index of implicit 
incentives in a repeated relationship between the firm and the manager 
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(Dewatripont et al., 1999a,b; Dixit, 2002). In a “career concerns” setting, it may be 
unnecessary to provide explicit incentives to induce effort, since the prospect of 
indirect incentives in the form of improved prospects for future rewards may 
suffice. These implicit incentives are especially relevant in public organizations, 
such as a utility firm, since the explicit incentives are rather weak. This issue is 
relevant in our framework: in an autonomous or limited liability company, 
managers may be motivated by the possibility of rewards in the forms of future 
employment, by some other utility, or even by the private sector; while in a 
directly managed State-owned firm, the manager is simply an employee of the 
local government and implicit incentives are much weaker or even absent. 
Turning back to the theoretical framework, as in a Nash-bargaining game, the 
Government and the Manager split the fraction α  of the net benefit 50:50. 
Therefore, the manager maximizes: 
[ ])()(
2
ebecαePMax
e
−+−         (5)  
Then, the optimal effort level when the Manager can renegotiate his pay-off is: 
[ ] 1
2
)ˆ()ˆ( =′+′− αeceb        (6) 
All in all, we can observe that the effort level in the presence of a corporatized 
firm is higher than the effort level of a directly managed state-owned firm 
(i.e., *ˆ eeeDM << ), and so the cost efficiency is larger in the latter case. 
Moreover, as long as the manager is given additional control rights over the firm 
(i.e., the parameter α increases due to a change in the degree of corporatization 
passing from a direct management firm to an autonomous company, or to a 
limited liability company), the incentives to increase firm efficiency are enlarged. 
3. THE CORPORATIZATION PROCESS OF LOCAL 
PUBLIC SERVICES IN ITALY 
In Italy, local public services were traditionally carried out by local municipalities 
with in-house arrangements. This regime was established by the Giolitti Law in 
1903 (and later confirmed in 1925 by a specific law for local municipalities) and 
lasted until the beginning of the 1990s. During this timeframe, local services were 
managed directly by local municipalities and even when a distinct business was 
created (the so-called Azienda Municipalizzata), it was subject to the same standard 
administrative and accounting rules as those provided for local governments.  
202 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7:1, 2011
Starting from 1990, a new regime was established with the introduction of Law 
142/90, which reinforced the role of local municipalities and defined the birth of 
the “special company” (Azienda Speciale), a particular type of firm controlled by 
the local government but with more budgetary and operational autonomy. The 
main idea of this reform was to shelter the management of a firm from the 
influence of policy-makers. But still the process was not complete, since local 
utilities were in large part directly run by local governments. Therefore, the 
Italian government introduced a new and much more powerful reform in 1997 
(Law 127/1997), with the aim of providing incentives for local municipalities to 
transform the special companies into standard limited liability enterprises. Then 
Law 448/2001 established that, by the end of June 2003, all special companies 
had to be reorganized as standard limited liability companies, but subsequent 
reforms postponed such a deadline. At the moment, each local municipality can 
decide to manage its services through a publicly-controlled firm (i.e., in-house) or 
through a limited liability company (SpA).2 
More recently, the local public transport (LPT) sector – together with the rest 
of local public services, such as water and waste sectors – has been reformed by 
Law 166/2009. Article 23/bis states that, starting from January 2011, the LPT 
service should be assigned through a (compulsory) bidding process. Alternatively, 
a local municipality may decide to transfer the ownership (at least partially, but 
not below 40%) of the LPT company through an auction; obviously this is 
possible only after transforming the company into a limited liability one (SpA). 
However, this reform does not directly force LPT companies to change their 
internal organization and so to pursue a corporatization process. 
All in all, the purpose of the above reforms is to spur economic efficiency within 
the local public sector, more specifically, within local public utilities. The 
separation between management and ownership was supposed to be an important 
instrument for reducing costs and for providing better service to citizens. The 
revision of budgetary and accounting rules has been the main element used by the 
legislature in order to provide correct incentives to the managers for reaping 
productive efficiency and reducing the waste of public funds.3 
Differently from those local utilities active in sectors such as gas and energy 
distribution, where private firms compete with publicly-owned companies, and 
similarly to firms that provide water services, public transit systems represent a 
natural experiment to test the effectiveness of the corporatization process 
                                                
2 It is worth noticing that, while the reform permits local municipalities to sell at least a fraction of 
the firms to private partners, the first of these private investors appeared only starting in 2005. 
3 See Bognetti and Robotti (2007) for a recent evaluation of the local public service reforms in 
Italy, with particular reference to the creation of mixed (public-private) companies. 
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involved in the above reforms. Indeed, some important interventions during the 
second half of the 1990’s (Law 549/1995, and the subsequent decreti legislativi 
422/1997 and 400/1999) have reformed the organization of the sector in several 
respects, among which changes in the governance of corporatization forms have 
been foreseen. However, the few attempts to introduce competitive tendering for 
the provision of local public transport service and to promote private public 
partnerships (PPPs), have been largely unsuccessful due to political resistance, 
especially at the local level. Therefore, our dataset includes the following three 
different types of governance – the municipal company (Azienda Municipalizzata), 
the autonomous company (Azienda Speciale) and the corporatized company 
(limited liability company or SpA) – and is particularly suitable for investigating 
the impact of firm type on productive performance. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1. SPECIFICATION OF THE COST FUNCTION MODEL 
Empirical studies on the cost structure of bus companies traditionally assume 
total cost as a function of output, the price of inputs (capital, labor and 
energy price) and some output characteristic variables, such as network 
length, the number of stops, and average commercial speed.4 Generally, the 
output characteristic variables are introduced in the model in order to capture 
some of the heterogeneity in the output and in the different service areas. 
Most of these studies also include a time trend to control for potential 
changes in the technology.  
According to the discussion above, another group of factors likely to 
influence production costs concerns the internal governance system of bus 
companies, i.e., status as a municipal company, autonomous company, or SpA 
corporation. In this study, relying on the same empirical approach as that 
followed by Filippini and Prioni (2003), Mizutani and Urakami (2003), and Roy 
and Yvrande-Billon (2007) to assess the effects of ownership structure, we 
choose to investigate the impact of changes in the organizational form on total 
cost – which represents the main focus of our analysis – by including two 
binary indicators for the governance type in the model specification:  
( )U, DMIX, T, DSPA, DA, p, py, n, s, pfC EKL =   (7) 
                                                
4  Since in most cases not only the network but also the schedule of a bus operator is regulated 
and predetermined, it is common to estimate a cost rather than a production function. 
204 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7:1, 2011
where C is the annual total production cost and y is the output. n and s 
represent network size and average commercial speed, respectively. pK , pE and 
pL are the prices of capital, energy and labor inputs. In order to test for the 
effects of the governance form on the cost, we introduce into the model the 
following dummy variables:5 DSPA, which is equal to 1 for bus companies that 
are corporations and 0 for other organizational types, and DAU, which is equal 
to 1 for firms that are autonomous companies and 0 for other governance. 
Moreover, since our sample includes both “specialized” companies (which 
provide only urban service) and “mixed” companies (which provide a 
combination of urban and intercity services), we add a service-specific dummy for 
“mixed” firms, so as to capture possible cost savings due to the diversification of 
the productive activity:6 DMIX is equal to 1 for bus companies operating both in 
intercity and urban areas and 0 otherwise. Finally, the trend variable T reflects the 
effects on costs due to technical progress occurring over the observed years.  
To estimate the cost function (7), a translog specification is chosen. Indeed, 
given the regularity conditions ensuring duality, the estimation of a translog 
model does not impose any other a priori restriction on the characteristics of the 
underlying technology. In particular, the returns to scale as well as the 
substitution elasticity between inputs can vary with both the output level and the 
specific combination of productive factors. This assumption fully satisfies the 
criterion of model generality.7 The translog approximation to (7) is written as: 
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5 The municipal form is excluded from the econometric model in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. Thus, this form is the benchmark for the interpretation of the institutional 
dummy variables. 
6 These benefits could arise from better exploitation of some sharable inputs, in particular, the 
workforce (drivers and administrative staff) and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the rolling stock. For 
more discussion on this issue, see Fraquelli et al. (2004), Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2010), and 
Farsi et al. (2007). 
7 Notice that the translog model requires the approximation of the underlying cost function to 
be made at a local point, which in our case is taken at the mean of all variables. Thus, all 
independent variables are normalized at their average points. 
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where the subscripts i and t denote the company and the year, respectively. The 
technical change is specified as a linear trend and is assumed to be neutral with 
respect to cost-minimizing input ratios.8 Note that by normalizing total cost and 
input prices by one of the input prices (here, the price of energy pE), we impose 
the theoretical condition that the cost function is linearly homogeneous in input 
prices. The other theoretical restrictions are verified after the estimation.  
The estimation of the cost function (8) enables us to derive information on the 
impact of governance on costs, as well as on other important characteristics of 
bus supply technology, such as economies of density and scale. In fact, in 
network industries it is important to distinguish between the cost changes that 
occur because of output expansions only and those cost changes that occur 
because of a proportional network and output expansion. Therefore, the 
distinction between scale and density economies is particularly important in 
network industries.  
Economies of density are defined as the increase in total cost resulting from 
an increase in output, holding all input prices and the network size fixed:  
y
CED
ln
ln
1
∂
∂
=          (9) 
Economies of density exist if ED is greater than 1. For values of ED below 1, we 
identify diseconomies of density. The existence of economies of density implies 
that average unitary costs of a bus operator decrease as physical output increases. 
In the case of ED = 1, no economies or diseconomies of density exist.  
Slightly different is the definition of economies of scale. Here, the increase in 
the total cost is brought about by a proportional increase in output and in the 
network size, holding the factor prices constant. According to this definition, 
ES can be written as: 
n
C
y
CES
ln
ln
ln
ln
1
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=       (10) 
Similarly to ED, economies of scale exist if ES is greater than 1. A value of 
ES below 1 indicates the presence of diseconomies of scale and would 
highlight the opportunity of breaking-up the existing monopoly network so as 
to introduce side-by-side competition.  
                                                
8 In other words, the technical change does not alter the optimal input bundles. 
206 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7:1, 2011
4.2. DATA AND VARIABLES 
To estimate the cost model described in (8), economic and technical data from 
sampled bus transit providers was required. In order to get these data, we carried 
out a survey using a mail questionnaire. In this survey we asked a sample of 
small, medium-sized and large operators to report cost and technical data, as well 
as information on the governance form of their business organization. The final 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 33 bus transit companies over the 
1993-2002 time period, for a total of 261 observations.9 
Our sample firms, which on aggregate are responsible for about 70% of total 
revenues of the sector, are fairly representative of the universe of Italian LPT 
operators. As for the service type, 15 companies are specialized in the urban 
segment, while the remaining 18 are “mixed” companies operating in both urban 
and intercity areas. As for their localization on the territory, 19 firms provide 
service in the Northern Regions, while 6 and 8 firms operate in Central and 
Southern Italy, respectively. The SpA corporation form appears in 29 cases, 
while the other two governance categories – autonomous and municipal 
companies – are responsible for 99 and 133 unit observations, respectively. The 
sample composition by governance structure in each year is shown in table 1, 
from which one can notice that most of the observations concerning SpA 
corporations are concentrated in the last three years (2000-2002).10 
Preliminary descriptive statistics in table 2 show that average unitary cost 
(total cost divided by supplied seat-kilometers) is highest for the group of 
municipal companies, and lowest for the SpA corporations, while intermediate 
values are exhibited in the autonomous company category. It is precisely such a 
link between cost performance and organizational form that we intend to test 
in a context of a multivariate regression analysis. 
                                                
9 In order to assess the effects of the different institutional changes leading to corporatization 
described in section 3, the sampled bus transit companies were observed over a significant time 
period (7 to 10 years). The unbalanced nature of the panel is due to difficulties in obtaining 
detailed information on the cost structure after 1999, principally because of some relevant 
organizational changes (through mergers and acquisitions, as well as through corporatization) 
that occurred for most companies starting from 2000. Table 1 highlights the panel structure of 
the sample used in the cost function estimation.  
10 This is the main reason why the influence of governance form has not been analyzed in 
previous recent studies on production costs of Italian bus transit systems, which are all limited to 
the 1993-1999 period (see Buzzo Margari et al., 2007; Cambini et al., 2007; Piacenza, 2006). 
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Table 1. Sample Composition by Year and Governance Form  
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
nr. 
Municipal company 94% 82% 73%  52%  33%  33%  21%  20%  20%  10% 133 
Autonomous company 3% 15% 24%  42%  61%  61%  67%  50%  20%  20% 99 
SpA corporation  3% 3% 3%   6%   6%   6%   12%   30%   60%   70% 29 
Total number   33   33   33 33 33 33 33 10 10 10 261 
 
Table 2. Average Unitary Cost by Governance Form  
Municipal company Autonomous company SpA corporation 
Average unitary cost 
(10-2 € per seat-km) 3.78 3.54 3.30 
Total observations 133 99 29 
 
The variables for the cost function specification were calculated as follows. 
Total production cost C is calculated as the total expenditures of the bus 
companies per year. The output ( y ) is measured in seat-kilometers. The choice of 
this output measure is twofold. First, we recognize that output in cost function 
estimations is better represented by pure supply output measures. We believe 
that the alternative use of demand-related output measures (such as passenger 
revenue or passenger trips) is inadequate in cost function estimations as they 
mainly reflect consumed and not produced output. Second, seat-kilometers is the 
most commonly used supply-related output measure in the empirical literature, 
and is particularly appropriate for our sample, which includes both urban and 
intercity operators. The output characteristic variable n represents the network 
length, measured in total kilometers of bus routes, while the second output 
characteristic variable s indicates the average commercial speed of vehicles and 
reflects the number of kilometers per hour of service. 
Input prices are defined as factor expenditures per factor unit. Labor price 
(pL ) is defined as the ratio of annual labor costs to total number of employees. 
The capital price (pK ) is calculated as the sum of depreciation and materials and 
services costs divided by the number of vehicles in the operator’s fleet weighted 
by age. Unfortunately, no data were available which would allow us to calculate 
the capital stock using the capital inventory method. The use of a simple 
indicator is justified by the fact that the bus companies do not possess a 
significant stock of capital apart from the rolling stock. Finally, energy price ( pE ) 
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is computed as the ratio of annual fuel costs to total number of liters of diesel 
fuel. All input prices, as well as total cost, are corrected for inflation over the 
years to the 1999 constant euros general production price index. Summary 
statistics of the variables used in the analysis are provided in table 3. 
4.3. ESTIMATION METHOD AND RESULTS 
With regard to the choice of the econometric technique, it should be noted 
that the econometric literature on panel data offers various types of models 
focusing on cross-sectional variation, i.e., heterogeneity across units. The two 
most widely used approaches are the fixed-effects (LSDV) and the random-
effects (GLS) models.  
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variables (unit of measurement) Mean    St. dev.        Min    Max 
Total production cost a (103 € ) 70,113 116,368 8,139 743,662
Seat-kilometers (10 6 ) 1,799 2,728 226 15,489
Network length (kms of routes) 1,448 1,177 64 5,135
Average speed (kms per hour of bus service) 20 6 10 33
Rolling stock (number of buses) 434 501 69 2,806
Workforce (number of employees) 1,305 2,096 151 13,344
Labor price (103 € per employee) 37.97 3.57 29.59 47.38
Energy price (€ per liter of diesel fuel) 0.59 0.07 0.44 0.90
Capital price b (103 € per bus) 28.32 9.64 11.39 62.61
Mixed service c (number of 1) 0.54 0.50 0 1
Autonomous company (number of 1) 0.38 0.49 0 1
SpA corporation (number of 1) 0.11 0.31 0 1
    a
 Sum of labor, energy and capital costs. 
    b
 Capital cost is the sum of depreciation and materials and services expenses. 
    c
 Dummy for bus companies providing both urban and intercity services.  
 
In the LSDV approach a complete set of cross-section dummy variables is 
introduced in the cost specification model. This means that the LSDV approach 
allows a separate constant term for each unit, while in the random effects 
approach the individual terms ui are considered to be random variables. In this 
case, firm-specific differences across units are not viewed as parametric shifts of 
the regression function as in the LSDV model, but as randomly distributed 
shocks. For this study we decided to use a random effects model for two 
reasons. First, in using the LSDV model it is not possible to estimate the 
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parameters of time-invariant observations, e.g., the dummy variable for the 
type of service (DMIX) included in model (8). Secondly, the data show a 
relatively low variation over time (within variation) in some of the variables. As 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pointed out, the fixed-effects approach has an 
important weakness, in that the estimated coefficients of explanatory variables 
are “very imprecise” if the variables’ variation over time (within variation) is 
dominated by that across companies (between variation).11 Therefore, the 
following comments are based on the results obtained by estimating a random 
effects (GLS) model, with ui ∼ iid N (0,
2
uσ ). This model also has a clear advantage 
over an alternative cross-sectional model that pools the data across companies, 
because it takes into account part of the unobserved heterogeneity across units.12 
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates and standard errors of the translog 
cost function (8). The estimated model is well-behaved. Most of the 
coefficients are statistically significant and carry the expected sign. Parameter 
estimates satisfy the regularity condition of concavity in input prices at the 
average point of approximation, which requires that the own-price elasticities 
of inputs be negative and that the Hessian matrix be negative semi-definite. 
Because both homogeneity in input prices and symmetry of the second order 
terms were imposed, the estimated function satisfies all regularity conditions of 
a theoretically valid total cost model. Since production costs, as well as output 
and input variables, are expressed in natural logarithms and have been 
normalized to their respective average values, the first-order coefficients can be 
directly interpreted as cost elasticities evaluated at the sample mean. 
The average cost elasticities with respect to factor prices are positive. The 
estimated coefficients for price of labor (0.68) and price of capital (0.16) 
reflect the shares of total costs attributed to labor and capital at the mean 
point of production. The imposed linear homogeneity condition implies that 
the estimated coefficient for energy is 0.16. Summarizing, on average labor 
expenses account for 68%, capital expenses for 16%, and energy expenses for 
16% of total production cost.  
                                                
11 Johnston and Di Nardo (1997) also show that the “attenuation” bias due to measurement 
errors is exacerbated in the fixed-effects models, depending on the fraction of the within 
variation due to “mismeasurement,” especially when the explanatory variables are correlated 
across time. In our case both reporting errors and correlation across time are plausible. 
12 Another alternative would have been to estimate a cost system using a seemingly unrelated 
regression equations (SURE) approach. In our case this cost system consists of the cost 
function (8) and two-factor share equations for capital and labor. However, the traditional 
SURE approach does not take into account the unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. 
Therefore, we decided not to follow this approach.   
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Table 4. GLS Estimation of the Translog Total Cost Function (8)  
    *, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level. 
     a  In the random effects specification εi t = ei t + ui . 
 
Output elasticity is 0.84, implying that a 10% increase in the supplied seat-
kilometers will increase total cost only by 8.4%. The cost elasticity with respect 
to network length is, as expected, positive (0.07) and significant. Economies of 
scale (ES) and economies of network density (ED) estimated for the average 
bus operator are calculated according to the formula specified in equations (9) 
and (10). Notice that for the computation of ES and ED, factor prices as well 
Regressor Parameter estimate Standard error 
 Constant 39.762*** (3.355) 
ln y         0.842*** (0.025) 
ln n                           0.065** (0.030) 
ln s         -0.303*** (0.050) 
ln pL  0.678*** (0.039) 
ln pK   0.162*** (0.025) 
ln y ln n              -0.008 (0.034) 
ln y ln s -0.354*** (0.085) 
ln n ln s 0.215*** (0.082) 
ln y 2                 0.033* (0.018) 
ln n 2              -0.016 (0.018) 
ln s 2                     -0.299** (0.141) 
ln y ln pL 0.192*** (0.065) 
ln y ln pK               0.028 (0.037) 
ln n ln pL -0.217*** (0.069) 
ln n ln pK -0.141*** (0.033) 
ln s ln pL 0.989*** (0.222) 
ln s ln pK
 0.725*** (0.093) 
ln pL  ln pK -0.625*** (0.121) 
ln pL  
2
               0.132 (0.160) 
ln pK  
2
 0.153*** (0.040) 
DMIX 
                 -0.129** (0.052) 
DAU 
                 -0.020** (0.009) 
DSPA 
                 -0.037** (0.015) 
T -0.011*** (0.002) 
Log-Likelihood              489.425 
σ
e
 a
 
                 0.042 
σ
u
 
                 0.099 
R 2                  0.998 
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as commercial speed are held constant to their sample means. The indicator for 
density economies is greater than 1 (ED = 1.10), suggesting that medium-sized 
operators fail to operate at the optimal density of the network: a more intensive 
usage of the existing network would decrease the cost per seat-kilometer.13 
Turning toward scale economies, the indicator is greater than 1 (ES = 1.19), 
indicating that medium-sized operators fail to operate at the optimal scale: this 
result implies that for some bus companies that operate in adjacent territories, 
end-to-end mergers could be promoted. In general, the above evidence on 
technology properties tends to confirm that franchised monopolies, rather than 
side-by-side competition, are the most efficient form of production 
organization for public transit systems. 
The cost elasticity for commercial speed s is, as expected, negative (-0.30) and 
significant, suggesting that a 10% increase in speed (e.g., from 20 to 22 kms per 
hour) is effective in reducing operating cost considerably (-3%). The coefficient 
of the trend variable T is negative and significant at the 99% confidence level: this 
implies that Italian bus companies experienced cost savings of about 1% per year 
over the period considered, due to the impact of technological progress. Finally, 
the negative and significant coefficient for the dummy variable DMIX (-0.13) 
highlights that “mixed” companies, by being active in both urban and intercity 
areas, enjoy scope economies between the two types of bus service. 
The hypothesis regarding the presence of a significant influence of the 
corporatization process on production costs is accepted at the 95% confidence 
level. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical framework discussed in 
section 2, based on Hart et al. (1997) and Hart (2003), according to which the 
transformation of a State-owned firm from a municipal company to an 
autonomous company or an SpA corporation has the effect of increasing 
managerial effort level, and so presumably reducing production cost: the 
negative coefficients estimated for DSPA and DAU suggest that bus 
companies that are more independent from local government operate more 
efficiently as compared with bus companies directly managed by the public 
administration. Furthermore, as expected, the transformation of municipal 
companies into SpA corporations has a stronger impact in terms of cost 
reduction (-4%) than a transformation in an autonomous company (-2%)14; this 
                                                
13 However, such a strategy would require the existence of a market for bus services, which 
under the actual conditions and the constantly decreasing patronage levels, cannot be assumed. 
However, such information can be relevant for regulatory policy, since it allows one in principle 
to differentiate among the subsidies to be granted to each company according to the extent of 
density economies associated with the provision of a specific type of bus service.  
14 Cost elasticities with respect to the dummy variables DAU and DSPA represent the 
percentage impact on costs due to a shift of governance structure from municipal firm to 
212 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7:1, 2011
is probably due to the higher degree of freedom from the typical restrictions 
that are imposed on government agencies as far as personnel hiring and 
promotion, procurement and long-term investment budgetary operations are 
concerned (see the literature review in section 2). 
For a complete evaluation of these results, we also tried a specification in 
which a dummy variable is introduced in order to distinguish the regulatory 
regime for subsides (i.e., fixed-price versus cost-plus contracts) applied to each 
bus company. Particularly, we were interested in separating the effects on costs 
due to the introduction of fixed-price regulation from the influence of the 
corporatization process. The empirical results did not show a statistically 
significant impact of this variable, so that the latter has been excluded from the 
final model. While this result could suggest that incentive contracts, which 
were found to be effective in past studies focusing on the 1990’s (Piacenza, 2006; 
Buzzo Margari et al., 2007), are less effective in reducing costs as compared to 
changes in governance structure, our dataset does not allow us to reach a 
conclusive answer. In fact, while fixed-price regulation started in the mid 90’s, 
the transformation of bus operators into SpA corporations largely took place in 
the last three years covered by this study (i.e., 2000-2002). The analysis of the 
combined effect of the two institutional reforms represents an appealing topic 
for future research.15 However, for that purpose a richer and updated 
information set on regulatory contracts and governance structure will be 
needed. The latter would also permit us to assess whether the highlighted 
efficiency gains from the corporatization process can be sustained over the 
years, without introducing a real privatization of local utilities and the 
associated profit motivation.16  
                                                                                                                 
autonomous company or SpA corporation, respectively. These elasticities are computed as 
[exp(αAU) -1] and [exp(α SPA) -1]. 
15 It is worth noticing that, while Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) analyzed both ownership 
structure (private versus public) and contractual practices (fixed-prices versus cost-plus) in their 
study on French bus companies, they did it in two separate regressions, so that it is not possible 
to evaluate the joint (and possibly complementary) effect on production efficiency. 
16 On this issue, Stiglitz (2000:6) points out that according to some authors the gains implied 
by corporatization could not be maintained without the profit motive derived from private 
ownership. This occurs because “often the managers of government enterprises do well after 
privatization – becoming highly paid executives in the new private company and/or receiving hefty shares or 
options in the newly privatized company – and it is these economic returns which drive them to improve 
efficiency during the corporation stage.”  
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Finally, for robustness purposes, we also carried out a stochastic frontier 
estimation of our cost function model, obtaining results which are qualitatively 
very similar to those discussed above.17  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In many industries, especially in local public utilities, institutional reforms 
aimed at increasing cost efficiency have been characterized by a change of the 
internal governance system of the firms and their privatization. More 
specifically, in highly subsidized industries like local public transport, as noted 
by Stiglitz (2000), before a government enterprise is privatized, it typically goes 
through an intermediate stage labelled as corporatization, i.e. the transformation 
of a municipal firm into a limited liability company still under governmental 
control. It is therefore relevant, from both the policy and market efficiency 
points of view, to understand the effects of this governance reform on the cost 
of those local public services whose ownership is maintained by local 
government. Indeed, such an analysis sheds light on the issue of whether pure 
privatization is the only solution to agency problems in the governance system, 
or whether a restructured governance system can positively affect firms’ 
performance even if the ownership remains public. 
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper represents the first attempt 
to investigate the impact of the corporatization process within publicly-
provided local utilities. To this purpose, we use information on a typical local 
utility, such as bus services provided by public transit systems in Italy, which 
have experienced a change of their governance towards the corporate form 
during the 90’s and especially in the first years of the 2000’s, without 
                                                
17 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. In particular, we first estimated 
a panel data version of the Aigner et al. (1977) half-normal frontier cost function. Moreover, in 
order to take into account the unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity, we also estimated the 
“true” random effects frontier model proposed by Greene (2005), but we incurred convergence 
problems during the estimation procedure. In both frontier specifications we had to exclude the 
time trend variable. Indeed, as pointed out by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the introduction in 
a frontier model of a time trend or a series of time dummies among the regressors, as a proxy for 
technical progress, can cause non-unusual problems in estimation. However, the main results on 
the presence of economies of scale and density remain unchanged. The indicator for density 
economies is greater than 1 and larger than in the previous case (ED = 1.60). The indicator for 
scale economies is still greater than 1 and greater than before (ES = 1.35). In sum, the effect of 
scale and network dimensions appears to matter even more. Most importantly, focusing on the 
corporatization effect, we notice that the transformation of municipal companies into SpA 
corporations still has a stronger impact in terms of cost reduction, and this effect is greater than 
in the random estimation (-6%); the same holds true for a transformation into an autonomous 
company (-3.5%).  
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introducing private ownership. A total cost function approach is applied to a 
sample of 33 local bus companies over the period 1993-2002, relying on a 
random effects estimation procedure. The results suggest that the 
transformation of a municipal firm into an autonomous company – 
corresponding to the first stage of the corporatization process of Italian local 
utilities – or into a limited liability company can exert a reducing impact on 
production costs. This evidence supports the theoretical argument that 
effective incentive schemes can be put into place under corporatization (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994; Hart et al., 1997), and therefore that considerable efficiency gains 
can also occur in such an intermediate stage preceding a privatization process. 
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